Reevaluating Adversarial Examples in Natural Language by Morris, John X. et al.
Reevaluating Adversarial Examples in Natural Language
John X. Morris∗, Eli Lifland∗, Jack Lanchantin, Yangfeng Ji, Yanjun Qi
Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia
{jm8wx, edl9cy, jjl5sw, yj3fs, yq2h}@virginia.edu
Abstract
State-of-the-art attacks on NLP models have
different definitions of what constitutes a suc-
cessful attack. These differences make the at-
tacks difficult to compare. We propose to stan-
dardize definitions of natural language adver-
sarial examples based on a set of linguistic con-
straints: semantics, grammaticality, edit dis-
tance, and non-suspicion. We categorize pre-
vious attacks based on these constraints. For
each constraint, we suggest options for human
and automatic evaluation methods. We use
these methods to evaluate two state-of-the-art
synonym substitution attacks. We find that
perturbations often do not preserve semantics,
and 45% introduce grammatical errors. Next,
we conduct human studies to find a threshold
for each evaluation method that aligns with
human judgment. Human surveys reveal that
to truly preserve semantics, we need to sig-
nificantly increase the minimum cosine sim-
ilarity between the embeddings of swapped
words and sentence encodings of original and
perturbed inputs. After tightening these con-
straints to agree with the judgment of our
human annotators, the attacks produce valid,
successful adversarial examples. But quality
comes at a cost: attack success rate drops by
over 70 percentage points. Finally, we intro-
duce TextAttack, a library for adversarial at-
tacks in NLP.
1 Introduction
One way to evaluate the robustness of a machine
learning model is to search for inputs that produce
incorrect outputs. Inputs intentionally designed to
fool deep learning models are referred to as ad-
versarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2017). Ad-
versarial examples have been found to trick deep
∗* Equal contribution. Code implementation shared via
https://github.com/QData/TextAttack
neural networks for image classification: two im-
ages that look exactly the same to a human receive
completely different predictions from the classifier
(Goodfellow et al., 2014).
While successful in the image case, the idea of
an indistinguishable change lacks a clear analog in
text. Unlike images, two different sequences of text
are never entirely indistinguishable. This raises the
question: if indistinguishable perturbations are not
possible, what are adversarial examples in text?
The literature contains many often overlapping
definitions of adversarial examples in natural lan-
guage (Zhang et al., 2019). We consider each def-
inition to be valid. The correct definition varies
based on the threat model.
We propose a unified definition for successful
adversarial examples in natural language: inputs
that both fool the model and fulfill a set of linguis-
tic constraints defined by the attacker. In Section 2,
we present four constraints NLP adversarial exam-
ples may follow: semantics, grammaticality, edit
distance, and non-suspicion to human readers. We
categorize a selection of past attacks based on these
constraints.
After defining these constraints, we provide
guidelines for enforcement and discuss inherent
difficulties. We examine the effectiveness of pre-
viously suggested evaluation methods through the
lens of synonym substitution attacks by Alzantot
et al. (2018) and Jin et al. (2019). By applying our
evaluation methods to examples generated by each
attack, we see that the examples often fail to fulfill
the desired constraints.
To improve constraint evaluation, we introduce
TextAttack, an open-source library that separates
attacks from constraint evaluation methods. This
allows automatic evaluation of constraints to be
adjusted while holding the attack method constant.
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After tuning constraint evaluation to align with
human judgment, generated adversarial perturba-
tions preserve semantics, grammaticality, and non-
suspicion. Running Jin et al. (2019)’s attack with
stricter thresholds decreases attack success rate
from over 80% to under 20%. An automatic gram-
mar checker detects no additional grammatical er-
rors in the adversarial examples. Human evaluation
shows that while the attack is now less successful, it
generates perturbations that better preserves seman-
tics and are substantially less noticeable to human
judges.
The four main contributions of this paper are:
• Formally define constraints on adversarial pertur-
bations in natural language and suggest evalua-
tion methods for each constraint.
• Conduct a constraint evaluation case study, re-
vealing that state-of-the-art synonym-based sub-
stitution attacks often do not preserve semantics,
grammaticality, or non-suspicion.
• Show that by aligning automatic evaluation meth-
ods with human judgment, it is possible for at-
tacks to produce successful, valid adversarial ex-
amples. However, success rate drops by over
70%.
• Introduce TextAttack, an open-source library for
adversarial attacks in NLP. TextAttack decou-
ples attacks from constraint evaluation methods,
allowing for more rigorous and consistent con-
straint evaluation, as well as dedicated ablation
studies.
2 Constraints on Adversarial Examples
in Natural Language
We define F : X → Y as a predictive model,
for example, a deep neural network classifier. X
is the input space and Y is the output space. We
focus on adversarial perturbations which perturb
a correctly predicted input, x ∈ X , into an input
which fools the model, xadv. We define C1, ..., Cn
as a set of boolean functions indicating whether the
perturbation satisfies a certain constraint.
The task of an adversary is then:
Find xadv
s.t. FoolsModel(F,xadv)
∧ Ci(x,xadv)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
(1)
Adversarial attacks search for examples
which both fool the model, as represented by
FoolsModel(F,xadv), and restrict xadv such that
it follows constraints C1, ..., Cn.
The definition of FoolsModel depends on the
goal of the attack. Attacks on classification fre-
quently aim to either induce any incorrect classifi-
cation (untargeted) or induce a particular classifica-
tion (targeted). Attacks on other types of models
may have more sophisticated goals. For example,
attacks on translation may attempt to change every
word of a translation, or introduce targeted key-
words into the translation (Cheng et al., 2018).
A perturbation that achieves the goal of the at-
tack must also preserve the original correct output.
That is, the correct output for x must equal the
correct output for xadv.1
In addition to defining the goal of the attack, the
attacker must decide on the constraints perturba-
tions must meet. Different use cases require differ-
ent constraints. We build on the categorization of
attack spaces introduced by Gilmer et al. (2018) to
introduce a set of constraints for adversarial exam-
ples in natural language.
In the following subsections, we define four con-
straints on adversarial perturbations in natural lan-
guage: semantics, grammatically, edit distance, and
non-suspicion. We provide an examples of adver-
sarial perturbations that violate each constraint in
Table 1.
2.1 Semantics
This constraint requires that semantics be pre-
served between x and xadv. A concrete threat
model for this class of adversarial examples is
tricking plagiarism detection software. An attacker
must preserve the semantics of the original docu-
ment while avoiding detection.
Many attacks include the semantics constraint as
a way to ensure the ground truth output is preserved
(Zhang et al., 2019). As long as the semantics of an
input do not change, the ground truth output will
stay the same. There are exceptions: one could
imagine tasks for which preserving semantics does
not necessarily preserve the ground truth output.
For example, consider the task of classifying pas-
sages as written in either modern or Old English.
Perturbing “why” to “wherefore” may retain the
semantic meaning of the passage, but change its
1”Equal” is used loosely here. In the case of classification,
the true labels must be equal. But for tasks like translation
and summarization, only the semantics of the output must be
preserved.
2
Input, x: ”Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?” – William Shakespeare, Sonnet XVIII
Constraint Perturbation, xadv Explanation
Semantics Shall I compare thee to a winter’s day? xadv has a different meaning than x.
Grammaticality Shall I compares thee to a summer’s day? xadv is less grammatically correct than x.
Edit Distance Sha1l i conpp$haaare thee to a 5umm3r’s
day?
x and xadv have a large edit distance.
Non-suspicion Am I gonna compare thee to a summer’s day? A human reader may suspect this
sentence to have been modified. 1
1 Shakespeare never used the word “gonna”. Its first recorded usage wasn’t until 1806, and it didn’t become popular until the 20th century.
Table 1: Adversarial Constraints and Violations. For each of the four proposed constraints, we show an example
for which violates the specified constraint.
ground truth label.
2.2 Grammaticality
Under this constraint, the attacker is constrained
to perturbations which don’t introduce grammati-
cal errors.2 Grammatical errors don’t necessarily
change semantics, as illustrated in Table 1. In the
plagiarism threat model outlined above, the gram-
maticality constraint applies.
2.3 Edit Distance
This constraint specifies a maximum edit dis-
tance between x and xadv, either on the charac-
ter or word-level. The edit distance constraint is
useful when the attacker is willing to introduce
misspellings. Additionally, the edit distance con-
straint is sometimes used when improving the ro-
bustness of models. For example, Huang et al.
(2019) improves robustness when the attacker is
given a perturbation budget representing the maxi-
mum allowed character-level changes.
2.4 Non-suspicion
The non-suspicion constraint specifies that xadv
must appear to be unmodified. Consider the exam-
ple in Table 1. While the perturbation preserves
semantics and grammar, it switches between mod-
ern and Old English and thus may seem suspi-
cious to readers. Note that the definition of the
non-suspicious constraint is context-dependent. A
sentence that is non-suspicious in the context of
a kindergartner’s homework assignment might be
suspicious in the context of an academic paper. A
threat model where the non-suspicion constraint
does not apply is illegal PDF distribution, similar
to a case discussed by Gilmer et al. (2018). Con-
sumers of an illegal PDF may tacitly collude with
the person uploading it. They know the document
has been altered, but do not care as long as seman-
2The grammaticality constraint refers to descriptive rather
than prescriptive grammar.
tics are preserved.
3 Categorization of Current Attacks
After choosing a set of constraints, the attacker
must devise a method to fool the model. Here, we
categorize a sample of the most significant attacks,
summarized in Table 2.
Attacks by Paraphrase: Some studies have gen-
erated adversarial examples through paraphrase.
Iyyer et al. (2018) used neural machine transla-
tion systems to generate paraphrases. Ribeiro et al.
(2018) proposed semantically-equivalent adversar-
ial rules. By definition, paraphrases preserve se-
mantics. Since the systems aim to generate perfect
paraphrases, they implicitly follow constraints of
grammaticality and non-suspicion.
Attacks by Synonym Substitution: Some works
focus on an easier way to generate a subset of
paraphrases: replacing words from the input with
synonyms (Alzantot et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019;
Kuleshov et al., 2018; Papernot et al., 2016; Ren
et al., 2019). Each attack applies a search algo-
rithm to determine which words to replace with
which synonyms. Like the general paraphrase case,
they aim to create examples that preserve seman-
tics, grammaticality, and non-suspicion. While not
all have an explicit edit distance constraint, some
limit the number of words perturbed.
Attacks by Character Substitution: Some stud-
ies have proposed to attack natural language classi-
fication models by deliberately misspelling words
(Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2018; Li et al.,
2018). These attacks use character replacements
to change a word into one that the model doesn’t
recognize. The replacements are designed to create
character sequences that a human reader would
easily correct into the original words. If there
aren’t many misspellings, non-suspicion may be
preserved. Semantics are preserved as long as hu-
3
Selected Attacks Generating Adversarial
Examples in Natural Language
Semantics Grammaticality Edit
Distance
Non-
Suspicion
Synonym Substitution. (Alzantot et al.,
2018; Kuleshov et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019;
Ren et al., 2019)
3 3 3 3
Character Substitution. (Ebrahimi et al.,
2017; Gao et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018)
3 7 3 3
Word Insertion or Removal. (Liang et al.,
2017; Samanta and Mehta, 2017)
3 3 3 3
General Paraphrase. (Zhao et al., 2017;
Ribeiro et al., 2018; Iyyer et al., 2018)
3 3 7 3
Table 2: Summary of Constraints and Attacks. This table shows a selection of prior work (rows) categorized
by constraints (columns). A “3” indicates that the respective attack is supposed to meet the constraint, and a “7”
means the attack is not supposed to meet the constraint.
man readers can correct the misspellings.
Attacks by Word Insertion or Removal: Liang
et al. (2017) and Samanta and Mehta (2017) de-
vised a way to determine the most important words
in the input and then used heuristics to generate
perturbed inputs by adding or removing important
words. In some cases, these strategies are com-
bined with synonym substitution. These attacks
aim to follow all constraints.
4 Constraint Evaluation Methods and
Case Study
For each constraint introduced in Section 2, we
discuss best practices for both human and auto-
matic evaluation. We leave out edit distance due to
ease of automatic evaluation.
Additionally, we perform a case study, evalu-
ating synonym substitution attack techniques by
Alzantot et al. (2018) and Jin et al. (2019) on clas-
sification tasks. We chose these works because:
• They claim to create perturbations that preserve
semantics, maintain grammaticality, and adhere
to the non-suspicion constraint. However, our in-
spection of the adversarial perturbations revealed
that many introduced grammatical errors and did
not preserve semantics.
• They report high attack success rates.3
• These methods attack two of the most effective
models for text classification: LSTM and BERT.
In their work, Alzantot et al. (2018) used a
genetic algorithm to attack an LSTM trained on
the IMDB4 document-level sentiment classifica-
3We use “attack success rate” to mean the percentage of
the time that an attack can find a successful adversarial exam-
ple by perturbing a given input. “After-attack accuracy” or
“accuracy after attack” is the accuracy the model achieves after
all successful perturbations have been applied.
4https://datasets.imdbws.com/
tion dataset. Jin et al. (2019) used a greedy ap-
proach to attack an LSTM, CNN, and BERT trained
on five classification datasets. To generate exam-
ples for evaluation, we attacked BERT using Jin
et al. (2019)’s method and attacked an LSTM using
Alzantot et al. (2018)’s method. We evaluate both
methods on the IMDB dataset. In addition, we eval-
uate Jin et al. (2019)’s method on the Yelp polarity
document-level sentiment classification dataset and
the Movie Review (MR) sentence-level sentiment
classification dataset (Pang and Lee, 2005; Zhang
et al., 2015). We use 1, 000 examples from each
dataset. Table 3 shows example violations of each
constraint.
4.1 Evaluation of Semantics
4.1.1 Human Evaluation
A few past studies of attacks have included hu-
man evaluation of semantic preservation (Ribeiro
et al., 2018; Iyyer et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018;
Jin et al., 2019). However, studies often simply ask
users to simply rate the similarity of x and xadv.
We believe this phrasing does not generate an ac-
curate measure of semantic preservation, as users
may consider two sentences with different seman-
tics “similar” if they only differ by a few words.
Instead, users should be explicitly asked whether
changes between x and xadv preserve the meaning
of the original passage.
We propose to ask human judges to rate if mean-
ing is preserved on a Likert scale of 1-5, where 1 is
“Strongly Disagree” and 5 is “Strongly Agree” (Lik-
ert, 1932). A perturbation is semantics-preserving
if the average score is at least sem. We propose
sem = 4 as a general rule: on average, humans
should either “Agree” or “Strongly Agree” that x
and xadv have the same meaning.
4
Constraint Violated Input, x Perturbation, xadv
Semantics Jagger, Stoppard and director Michael
Apted deliver a riveting and
surprisingly romantic ride.
Jagger, Stoppard and director Michael
Apted deliver a baffling and
surprisingly sappy motorbike.
Grammaticality A grating, emaciated flick. A grates, lanky flick.
Non-suspicion Great character interaction. Gargantuan character interaction.
Table 3: Real World Constraint Violation Examples. Perturbations by Jin et al. (2019)’s attack against the BERT
classification model on sentences from the MR dataset. In each example, our case study finds a violation of the
respective constraint. Each x is classified as positive, and each xadv is classified as negative.
4.1.2 Automatic Evaluation
Automatic evaluation of semantic similarity is
a well-studied NLP task. The STS Benchmark is
used as a common measurement (Cer et al., 2017).
Michel et al. (2019) explored the use of the
common evaluation metrics for machine transla-
tion BLEU, METEOR, and chrF as a proxy for
semantic similarity in the attack setting (Papineni
et al., 2002; Denkowski and Lavie, 2014; Popovic´,
2015). While these n-gram based approaches are
computationally cheap and often work well in the
machine translation setting, they do not correlate
with human judgment as well as sentence encoders
(?).
A sentence encoder encodes two sentences into
a pair of fixed-length vectors, then the cosine dis-
tance between the vectors is used as the similarity
score. Jin et al. (2019) uses the Universal Sentence
Encoder (USE) to evaluate semantic similarity,
which achieved a Pearson correlation score of 0.782
on the STS benchmark (Cer et al., 2018). Another
option for evaluation is BERT, which achieved a
score of 0.876 (Devlin et al., 2018).
Additionally, synonym substitution methods, in-
cluding Jin et al. (2019) and Alzantot et al. (2018),
often require that words be substituted only with
neighbors in the counter-fitted embedding space,
which is designed to push synonyms together and
antonyms apart (Mrksic et al., 2016).
4.1.3 Case Study
We asked users whether they agreed that the
changes between the two passages preserved mean-
ing on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5
(Strongly Agree). We averaged scores for each
attack method to determine if the method generally
preserves semantics.
Examples generated by Jin et al. (2019) were
rated an average of 3.28, while examples generated
by (Alzantot et al., 2018) were rated on average
2.70.5 The average rating given for both methods
was significantly less than our proposed sem of 4.
Using a clear survey question illustrates that many
perturbations are not semantics-preserving.
4.2 Evaluation of Grammaticality
4.2.1 Human Evaluation
Both Jin et al. (2019) and Iyyer et al. (2018) re-
ported a human evaluation of grammaticality, but
neither study clearly asked if any errors were in-
troduced by a perturbation. For human evaluation
of the grammaticality constraint, we propose pre-
senting x and xadv together and asking judges if
grammatical errors were introduced by the changes
made. However, due to the rule-based nature of
grammar, automatic evaluation is preferred.
4.2.2 Automatic Evaluation
The simplest way to automatically evaluate
grammatical correctness is with a rule-based gram-
mar checker. Free grammar checkers are available
online in many languages. One popular checker is
LanguageTool, an open-source proofreading tool
(Naber, 2003). LanguageTool ships with thousands
of human-curated rules for the English language
and provides a downloadable server interface for
analyzing sentences. While other rule-based and
some model-based grammar checkers exist, com-
parison between them is outside the scope of this
work.
4.2.3 Case Study
We ran each of the generated (x,xadv) pairs
through LanguageTool to count grammatical errors.
LanguageTool detected more grammatical errors
in xadv than x for 51% of perturbations generated
by Jin et al. (2019), and 29% of perturbations gen-
erated by Alzantot et al. (2018).
Additionally, perturbations often contain errors
that humans rarely make. LanguageTool detected
6 categories for which errors in the perturbed sam-
5We hypothesize that Jin et al. (2019) achieved higher
scores due to its use of USE.
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ples appear with at least 10 times more frequently
than in the original content. Details regarding se-
lect error categories and examples of violations are
shown in Table 4.
4.3 Evaluation of Non-suspicion
4.3.1 Human Evaluation
We propose to evaluate the non-suspicion con-
straint with a method in which judges view a shuf-
fled mix of real and adversarial inputs and must
guess whether each is real or computer-altered.
This is similar to the human evaluation done by
Ren et al. (2019), but binary rather than on a 1-5
scale.6 A perturbed example xadv meets the non-
suspicion constraint if the portion of judges who
identify xadv as computer-altered is at least ns,
where 0 ≤ ns ≤ 1.
4.3.2 Automatic Evaluation
Automatic evaluation may be used to guess
whether or not an adversarial example is suspicious.
Models can be trained to classify passages as real
or perturbed, just as human judges do. For example,
Warstadt et al. (2018) trained sentence encoders on
a real/fake task as a proxy for evaluation of lin-
guistic acceptability. Recently, Zellers et al. (2019)
demonstrated that GROVER, a transformer-based
text generation model, could classify its own gen-
erated news articles as human or machine-written
with high accuracy.
4.3.3 Case Study
We presented a shuffled mix of real and per-
turbed examples to human judges and asked if they
were real or computer-altered. As this is a time-
consuming task for long documents, we only eval-
uated adversarial examples generated by Jin et al.
(2019)’s method on the sentence-level MR dataset.
If all generated examples were non-suspicious,
judges would average 50% accuracy. In this case,
judges achieved 69.2% accuracy.
5 Producing Higher Quality Adversarial
Examples
In the previous section, we evaluated how well
generated examples met constraints. Now, we ad-
just the constraints applied during the course of the
attack to produce higher quality adversarial exam-
ples.
The case study in Section 4 revealed that al-
6We believe that either method is valid.
though attacks in NLP aspire to meet linguistic con-
straints, in practice, they frequently violate them.
Inconsistent application of constraints leads to two
problems:
• For a single attack, constraints that are claimed
to be met may not be. Lenient constraint enforce-
ment correlates directly with attack success.
• Across multiple attacks, comparing effectiveness
is difficult. Comparing the success rates of two
attacks is only meaningful if the attacks follow
the same constraints, evaluated in the same man-
ner.
To alleviate these issues, we wrote TextAttack,
an open-source NLP attack library designed to de-
couple attack methods from constraint application.
TextAttack makes it easy for researchers to en-
force constraints properly and to compare attacks
while holding constraint enforcement techniques
constant. To demonstrate TextAttack, we continue
to study the attacks introduced by Jin et al. (2019)
and Alzantot et al. (2018). TextAttack can be used
to reproduce the original attack results.
We set out to find if a different set of thresholds
on evaluation metrics could produce adversarial
examples that are semantics-preserving, grammat-
ical and non-suspicious. We modified Jin et al.
(2019)’s attack with different constraints. To en-
force grammaticality, we added LanguageTool. To
enforce semantic preservation, we tuned two thresh-
olds which define the requirement for being able
to make a substitution: (a) minimum cosine simi-
larity between counter-fitted word embeddings and
(b) minimum cosine similarity between sentence
embeddings. Through human studies, we found
threshold values of 0.9 for (a) and 0.98 for (b)7.
5.1 Results with Adjusted Constraint
Application
We ran Jin et al. (2019)’s attack with the adjusted
thresholds and with LanguageTool used to enforce
grammaticality. Results are shown in Table 5.
Semantics. With the original attack, human judges
on average were “Not sure” that semantics were
preserved. After adjusting constraint evaluation,
human judges on average “Agree”.
Grammaticality. Automatic evaluation during the
attack ensured that xadv did not have more gram-
matical errors than x. Thus, our generated exam-
ples were observed to meet the grammaticality con-
7Details in Section A.1.1
6
Grammar Rule ID x xadv Explanation Context
AGREEMENT SENT START 2 38 You should probably use: ’are’. —— Replace is with one of [are] this films is too busiest beat all of its
allotted ma...
DID BASEFORM 21 326 The verb ’can’t’ requires base form of this verb: ’compare’ ——
Replace compares with one of [compare]
...first two cinema in the series, i can’t
compares friday after next to them,
but nothing ...
NON3PRS VERB 13 199 The pronoun ’i’ must be used with a non-third-person form of a
verb: ’surprise’ —— Replace surprises with one of [surprise]
...ved reached out hating the second
one i surprises why they saw iike the
same film to me
A PLURAL 24 330 Don’t use indefinite articles with plural words. Did you mean ’a
grate’, ’a gratis’ or simply ’grates’? —— Replace a grates with one
of [a grate,a gratis,grates]
a grates, lanky flick
TO NON BASE 4 48 The verb after ”to” should be in the base form: ’excuse’. ——
Replace excuses with one of [excuse]
doesn’t inbound close to excuses the
hype that surrounded its debut at t...
EN A VS AN 110 555 Use ’an’ instead of ’a’ if the following word starts with a vowel
sound, e.g. ’an article’, ’an hour’ —— Replace a with one of [an]
like a eastwards of the constraint
melrose pla...
Table 4: Many Adversarial Examples Contain Grammatical Errors. This table shows grammatical errors
detected by LanguageTool that appeared far more often in the perturbed samples. x and xadv denote the numbers
of errors detected in x and xadv across 3,115 examples generated by Jin et al. (2019) and Alzantot et al. (2018).
straint.8
Non-suspicion. We repeated the study from Sec-
tion 4.3 with our new examples. Participants were
able to guess with 58.8% accuracy whether inputs
were computer-altered. The accuracy is over 10%
lower than the accuracy on the examples generated
by the original attack.
Attack success. For each of the three datasets,
the attack success rate decreased by at least 71
percentage points.
5.2 Comparing the Two Attacks
We compared the relative success rates of Jin
et al. (2019) and Alzantot et al. (2018) with con-
straint evaluation held constant. We applied the
constraint evaluation methods from above and
tested each attack against BERT fine-tuned on the
MR dataset. Contrary to previous findings, Table
6 shows the two attacks had very similar success
rates. The attacks achieved similar scores on hu-
man evaluation of semantics and non-suspicion.
The genetic algorithm (Alzantot et al., 2018) was
slightly more successful than the greedy search (Jin
et al., 2019), but was far more computationally ex-
pensive, making over 100x as many model queries
on average.
6 Ablation Study
We generated better-quality adversarial exam-
ples by constraining the search to exclude exam-
ples that fail to meet thresholds measured in three
ways: word embedding distance, sentence encoder
8Since the MR dataset is already lowercased and tokenized,
it is difficult for a rule-based grammar checker like Language-
Tool to parse some inputs. A more powerful language checker
would filter out an even greater number of grammatical errors.
similarity, and grammaticality. Since we applied
these constraint evaluation methods all at the same
time, we performed an ablation study to understand
which constraints had the largest impact on attack
success rate.
We reran three attacks (one for each constraint re-
moved) on each of our BERT classification datasets.
Table 7 shows attack success rate after individually
removing each constraint. The word embedding
distance constraint was the greatest inhibitor of at-
tack success rate; without enforcing this constraint,
attacks were over twice as successful.
7 Discussion
Decoupling attacks and constraints. It is criti-
cal researchers separate new attack methods from
new constraint evaluation methods. Demonstrat-
ing the performance of a new attack while simul-
taneously introducing new constraints makes it
unclear whether empirical gains demonstrate a
more effective attack or a more relaxed set of con-
straints. This mirrors a broader trend in machine
learning where researchers report differences that
come from changing multiple independent vari-
ables, making the sources of empirical gains un-
clear (Lipton and Steinhardt, 2018). This is es-
pecially relevant in adversarial NLP, where each
experiment depends on many parameters.9
Ablation studies for NLP adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks in NLP need proper ablation
studies. TextAttack allowed us to compare attack
9While working to reproduce past work in TextAttack, we
noticed how differences that may seem negligible often have
an outsized impact on attack success rate. These include the
list of stopwords used, the maximum length of model inputs,
and tokenization strategies.
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IMDB Yelp MR SNLI MNLI
Semantic Preservation (before) 3.41 3.05 3.37 − −
Semantic Preservation (after) 4.06 3.94 4.18 − −
Grammatical Error % (before) 54.3 61.6 32.6 26.4 21.1
Grammatical Error % (after) 0 0 0 0 0
Non-suspicion % (before) − − 69.2 − −
Non-suspicion % (after) − − 58.8 − −
Attack Success % (before) 85.0 93.2 86.6 94.5 95.1
Attack Success % (after) 13.8 4.7 10.0 7.2 14.8
Difference (before - after) 71.2 88.5 76.6 87.3 80.3
Table 5: Results from running the attack from Jin et al. (2019) with and without constraint thresholds chosen with
human judgement. Attacks are on BERT classification models fine-tuned for the respective datasets.
Jin et al. (2019) Alzantot et al. (2018)
Semantic Preservation 4.06 4.11
Grammatical Error % 0 0
Non-suspicion Score 58.8 56.9
Attack Success % 10.3 10.9
Perturbed Word % 10.8 9.5
Num Queries 28 4, 160
Table 6: Comparison of Alzantot et al. (2018) and
Jin et al. (2019), with the same constraints, attacking
BERT fine-tuned on the MR dataset. Results across
1, 000 examples.
Constraint Removed MR Yelp IMDB
(Original) 10.3 5.0 13.8
Sentence Encoding 27.3 22.4 43.5
Word Embedding distance 40.0 29.4 81.5
Grammar Checking 11.5 5.1 14.5
Table 7: Ablation study: effect of removal of a single
constraint on total attack success rate.
strategies in a standardized environment. Moving
forward, TextAttack will be used for ablation stud-
ies that provide the community with an idea of the
relative performance of different attack strategies
and constraint evaluation methods. Additionally,
TextAttack may be used to help researchers gauge
model robustness against a variety of attacks.
Tradeoff between attack success and exam-
ple quality. We made semantic constraints more
selective, which helped attacks generate examples
that scored above 4 on the Likert scale for preser-
vation of semantics. This indicates that, when
only allowing adversarial examples that preserve
semantics and grammaticality, NLP models are
relatively robust to current synonym substitution
attacks. However, our set of constraints isn’t nec-
essarily optimal for every attack scenario. For ex-
ample, researchers using an attack for producing
additional training data may wish to allow pertur-
bations that are more flexible when it comes to
grammaticality and semantics.
8 Related Work
The goal of creating adversarial examples that
preserve semantics and grammaticality is common
in the NLP attack literature (Zhang et al., 2019).
However, previous works use different definitions
of adversarial examples, making it hard to compare
methods. We provide a unified definition of an ad-
versarial example based on the constraints it must
fulfill.
There are some existing open-source libraries
related to adversarial examples in NLP. Trickster
proposes a method for attacking NLP models based
on graph search but lacks the ability to ensure that
generated examples satisfy constraints (Kulynych
et al., 2018). TEAPOT is a library for evaluating
adversarial perturbations in text, but only supports
n-gram based comparisons for evaluating attacks
on machine translation models (Michel et al., 2019).
AllenNLP Interpret includes functionality for run-
ning adversarial attacks on NLP models, but only
supports attacks via input-reduction or gradient-
based word swap (Wallace et al., 2019b). TextAt-
tack has a broader scope than each of these libraries:
it is designed to be extendable to any attack on any
NLP model with any set of constraint evaluation
methods.
9 Conclusion
We have shown that state-of-the-art synonym
substitution attacks frequently do not preserve se-
mantics or grammaticality, and often appear sus-
picious to humans. When we adjusted constraint
evaluation to align with human judgement, we pro-
duced higher quality perturbations at a much lower
success rate. We encourage researchers to use Tex-
tAttack to enforce rigorous constraints and decou-
ple attacks from constraint evaluation methods.
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A Appendix
A.1 Details about Human Studies.
Our experiments relied on labor crowd-sourced
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We used five
datasets: MIT and Yelp datasets from (Alzan-
tot et al., 2018) and MIT, Yelp, and Movie Re-
view datasets from (Jin et al., 2019). We limited
our worker pool to workers in the United States,
Canada, Canada, and Australia that had completed
over 5,000 HITs with over a 99% success rate. We
had an additional Qualification that prevented work-
ers who had submitted too many labels in previous
tasks from fulfilling too many of our HITs. In the
future, will also use a small qualifier task to select
workers who are good at the task.
For the automatic portions of the case study in
Section 4, we use all successfully perturbed exam-
ples. For the human portions, we randomly select
100 successful examples for each combination of
attack method and dataset, then use Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk to gather 10 answers for each exam-
ple.
Rating Semantic Similarity. In one task, we
present results from two Mechanical Turk ques-
tionnaires to judge semantic similarity or dissim-
ilarity. For each task, we show x and xadv, side
by side, in a random order. We added a custom
bit of Javascript to highlight character differences
between the two sequences. We provided the fol-
lowing description: “Compare two short pieces of
English text and determine if they mean different
things or the same.” We then prompted labelers:
“The changes between these two passages preserve
the original meaning.” We paid $0.06 per label for
this task.
Inter-Annotator Agreement. For each semantic
similarity prompt, we gathered annotations from
10 different judges. Recall that each selection was
one of 5 different options ranging from “Strongly
10
Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” For each pair of
original and perturbed sequences, we calculated
the number of judges who chose the most frequent
option. For example, if 7 choose “Strongly Agree”
and 3 chose “Agree,” the number of judges who
chose the most frequent option is 7. We found that
for the examples studied in Section 4 the average of
this metric was 5.09. For the examples in Section 5
at the threshold of .98 which we chose, the average
was 5.6.
Guessing Real vs. Computer-altered. We
present results from our Mechanical Turk survey
where we asked users ”Is this text real or computer-
altered¿‘. We restricted this task to a single dataset,
Movie Review. We chose Movie Review because
it had an average sample length of 20 words, much
shorter than Yelp or IMDB. We made this restric-
tion because of the time-consuming nature of clas-
sifying long samples as Real or Fake. We paid
$0.05 per label for this task.
Rating word similarity. We performed a third
study where we asked showed users a pair of words
and asked ”In general, replacing the first word with
the second preserves the meaning of a sentence:“.
We paid $0.02 per label for this task.
Phrasing matters. Mechanical Turk comes with a
set of pre-designed questionnaire interfaces. These
include one titled “Semantic Similarity” which asks
users to rate a pair of sentences on a scale from
“Not Similar At All” to “Highly Similar.” Examples
generated by synonym attacks benefit from this
question formulation because humans tend to rate
two sentences that share many words as “Similar”
due to their small morphological distance, even if
they have different meanings.
Notes for future surveys. In the future, we would
also try to filter out bad labels by mixing some
number of ground-truth “easy” data points into
our dataset and rejecting the work of labelers who
performed poorly on this set.
A.1.1 Finding The Right Thresholds
Comparing two words. We showed study par-
ticipants a pair of words and asked them whether
swapping out one word for the other would change
the meaning of a sentence. The results are shown
in Figure 1. Using this information, we chose 0.9
as the word-level cosine similarity threshold.
Comparing two passages. With the word-
level threshold set at 0.9, we generated
Guessed Label
Real Computer-altered
True
Original 814 186
Perturbed 430 570
Table 8: Confusion matrix for humans guessing if per-
turbed examples are computer-altered
examples at sentence encoder thresholds
{0.95, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99}. We chose to encode
sentences with BERT fine-tuned for semantic
similarity: first on the AllNLI dataset, then on the
STS benchmark training set. We repeated the study
from 4.1.1 on 100 examples from each threshold,
obtaining 10 human labels per example. The
results are in Figure 2. On average, judges agreed
that the examples produced at 0.98 threshold
preserved semantics.
A.2 Further Analysis of Non-Suspicious
Constraint Case Study
Table 8 presents the confusion matrix of results
from the survey. Interestingly, workers guessed
that the examples were real 62.2% of the time, but
when they guessed that examples were computer-
altered they were right 75.4% of the time. Thus
while some perturbed examples are non-suspicious,
there are some which workers identify with high
precision.
A.3 The Need for Standardized Metrics
Supported By Human Evaluation
Jin et al. (2019) used an additional distance
metric d defined as the cosine similarity between
embeddings encoded by the Universal Sentence
Encoder (USE) in order to determine if a syn-
onym swap preserves semantic similarity (Cer et al.,
2018). Figure 3 shows accuracy under BERT under
attack by Jin et al. (2019)’s method as the maxi-
mum allowed cosine similarity between two sen-
tences’ USE embeddings increases 10 . As  be-
comes more strict, the attack becomes less success-
ful. Figure 4 plots the accuracy under attack as
the number of synonyms considered for each sub-
stitution increases. An attack that is more lenient
with its standard for what constitutes a synonym
is more successful. Previous methods vary in how
many synonyms they considered, with Alzantot
et al. (2018) considering 8, Kuleshov et al. (2018)
considering 15, and Jin et al. (2019) considering
50.
10The MR dataset is excluded due to no USE similarity
restrictions being enforced on inputs of less than 15 words.
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A.4 Expanding the Categorization of
Adversarial Examples in NLP
Recent work such as Jia and Liang (2017) and
Wallace et al. (2019a) explored the creation of
adversarial examples through concatenation of
phrases to the input. While these examples contain
the semantics of the original sentence, they also
add new meaning. Future work may expand our
framework to evaluate examples generated by this
type of semantic composition.
Another group of attacks generate adversarial
examples from scratch. Our constraints refer to
the case where the attacker starts from a benign
input and applies a perturbation to fool the model.
This is useful from the perspective of the defender,
since the defender can produce adversarial exam-
ples from inputs in the training set. However, in the
real world, attackers often do not create adversarial
examples from a starting point. An adversary who
generates a fake news article will not try to perturb
an article they find in the newspaper. The adversary
will try to generate the bogus article from scratch.
Without an original input for comparison, it is not
immediately clear how to evaluate semantic preser-
vation in this case. We leave it to future work to
define and evaluate constraints for inputs generated
from scratch.
A.5 Reproduction
The results in Table 9 compare the accuracy and
average percentage of perturbed words obtained
with TextAttack to the results previously reported.
Our reproduction is more successful at attacking
BERT than Jin et al. (2019) while perturbing more
words. Our reproduction perturbs much fewer
words than Alzantot et al. (2018), but achieves a
similar success rate 11.
One major implementation difference between
TextAttack and the attacks studied was that Tex-
tAttack does not tokenize inputs before running an
attack. This has some overhead, since every pertur-
bation has to be retokenized, but it has two major
11We believe Alzantot et al. (2018) may have misreported
their words perturbed percentage, as they set the maximum
words perturbed to 20% while reporting an average words
perturbed percentage of 14.7% for their genetic algorithm and
19%(!) for their baseline.
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(Jin et al., 2019) (Alzantot et al., 2018)
WordCNN WordLSTM BERT WordLSTM
AS % PW % AS % PW % AS % PW % AS % PW %
Theirs 100.0 3.5 99.7 5.1 85.0 6.1 97 14.7
Ours 100.0 4.1 97.7 6.6 97.6 9.7 95.9 4.9
Table 9: Comparison of results generated with TextAttack against results reported in original literature. Evaluated
on the IMDB movie review dataset. AS is Attack Success, the percentage of sucessful attacks on 1000 examples.
PW is the average percentage of words perturbed across attacks.
advantages. First, it prevents errors that arise when
words are broken into multiple tokens and individ-
ual tokens are swapped for other words. Second, it
prevents loss of information during retokenization.
A.6 Word Embeddings
It is common to perform synonym substitution
by replacing a word by a neighbor in the counter-
fitted embedding space. The distance between
word embeddings is frequently measured using Eu-
clidean distance, but it is also common to compare
word embeddings based on their cosine similarity
(the cosine of the angle between them). (Some
work also measures distance based on the mean-
squared error between embeddings, which is just
the square of Euclidean distance.)
For this reason, past work has sometimes con-
strained nearest neighbors based on the Euclidean
distance between two word vectors, and other times
based on their cosine similarity. Alzantot et al.
(2018) considered both distance metrics, and re-
ported that they ”did not see a noticeable improve-
ment using cosine.”
We would like to point out that, when us-
ing normalized word vectors (as is typical for
counter-fitted embeddings), filtering nearest neigh-
bors based on their minimum cosine similarity is
equivalent to filtering by maximum Euclidean
distance (or MSE, for that matter).
Proof. Let u, v be normalized word embed-
ding vectors. That is, ‖u‖ = ‖v‖ = 1. Then
u · v = ‖u‖‖v‖ cos(θ) = cos(θ).
‖u− v‖2 = (u− v) · (u− v)
= ‖u‖2 − 2(u · v) + ‖v‖2
= 2− 2(u · v)
= 2− 2 cos(θ).
Therefore, the Euclidean distance between u
and v is directly proportional to the cosine between
them. For any minimum cosine distance , we can
use maximum euclidean distance
√
2− 2 and
achieve the same result.
A.7 Examples In The Wild
We randomly select 10 attempted attacks from
the MR dataset and show the original inputs, pertur-
bations before constraint change, and perturbations
after constraint change. See Table 10.
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Original Perturbed Perturbed
(adjusted)
by presenting an impossible romance in an
impossible world , pumpkin dares us to say
why either is impossible – which forces us
to confront what’s possible and what we
might do to make it so. Pos: 99.5%
by presenting an unsuitable romantic in
an impossible world , pumpkin dares we
to say why either is conceivable – which
vigour we to confronted what’s possible
and what we might do to make it so. Neg:
54.8%
N/A
...a ho-hum affair , always watchable yet
hardly memorable. Neg: 83.9%
...a ho-hum affair , always watchable yet
just memorable. Pos: 99.8%
N/A
schnitzler’s film has a great hook , some
clever bits and well-drawn, if standard is-
sue, characters, but is still only partly sat-
isfying. Neg: 60.8%
schnitzler’s film has a great hook, some
clever smithereens and well-drawn, if stan-
dard issue, characters, but is still only
partly satisfying. Pos: 50.4%
schnitzler’s film
has a great hook,
some clever traits
and well-drawn,
if standard issue,
characters, but is
still only partly
satisfying. Pos:
56.9%
its direction, its script, and weaver’s perfor-
mance as a vaguely discontented woman
of substance make for a mildly entertain-
ing 77 minutes, if that’s what you’re in the
mood for. Pos: 99.5%
its direction, its script, and weaver’s perfor-
mance as a vaguely discontented woman
of substance pose for a marginally comi-
cal 77 minutes, if that’s what you’re in the
mood for. Neg: 65.5%
N/A
missteps take what was otherwise a fasci-
nating, riveting story and send it down the
path of the mundane. Pos: 99.1%
missteps take what was otherwise a fasci-
nating, scintillating story and dispatched
it down the path of the mundane. Neg:
51.2%
N/A
hawke draws out the best from his large
cast in beautifully articulated portrayals
that are subtle and so expressive they can
sustain the poetic flights in burdette’s dia-
logue. Pos: 99.9%
hawke draws out the better from his whole-
sale cast in terribly jointed portrayals that
are inconspicuous and so expressive they
can sustain the rhymed flight in burdette’s
dialogue. Neg: 60.3%
N/A
if religious films aren’t your bailiwick,
stay away. otherwise, this could be a pass-
able date film. Neg: 99.1%
if religious films aren’t your bailiwick,
stay away. otherwise, this could be a pre-
sentable date film. Pos: 86.6%
N/A
[broomfield] uncovers a story powerful
enough to leave the screen sizzling with
intrigue. Pos: 99.1%
[broomfield] uncovers a story pompous
enough to leave the screen sizzling with
plots. Neg: 59.2%
N/A
like its two predecessors, 1983’s koy-
aanisqatsi and 1988’s powaqqatsi, the cine-
matic collage naqoyqatsi could be the most
navel-gazing film ever. Pos: 99.4%
N/A N/A
maud and roland’s search for an unknow-
able past makes for a haunting literary de-
tective story, but labute pulls off a neater
trick in possession : he makes language
sexy. Pos: 99.4%
maud and roland’s search for an unknow-
able past makes for a haunting literary de-
tective story, but labute pulls off a neater
trick in property : he assumes language
sultry. Neg: 62.1%
N/A
Table 10: Ten random attempted attacks, attacking BERT fine-tuned for sentiment classification on the MR dataset.
Left column are original samples. Middle are perturbations with the constraint settings from Jin et al. (2019). Right
column are perturbations generated with constraints adjusted to match human judgement. N/A denotes the attack
failed to find a successful perturbation when with constraints matching human judgement. For 8 out of the 10
examples, the constraint adjustments caused the attack to fail. 14
